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18 By Akira Iriye
The key question facing mankind today
is that of war and peace. The superpow-
ers possess between them an arsenal of
nuclear weapons sufficient to destory the
entire globe, and other nations are also
intent upon acquiring and improving
their nuclear capabilities. Still others,
while not nuclear powers themselves,
have been earmarking larger and larger
portions of their budgets for increased
armament.
The traffic in arms has been such that
the flow of weapons from advanced to
Third World countries has constituted a
larger and larger share of the entire trade
of the world. It is as if mankind had a
death wish, fascinated by the prospect
of self-destruction.
As nations pile up military arms and
spend vast sums on improving technol-
ogy for mass killing, their internal political
systems have also tended to become
more militarized. Hitler's statement (soon
after his accession to power) that "the
main principle must be everything for the
armed forces," sounds less shocking
today than in 1933, as country after coun-
try has concentrated on building up
larger and more expensive forces, creat-
ing a close relationship among business,
industry, education, politics, and the mili-
tary establishment in which boundaries
between private and public sectors and
between peacetime and war-related
pursuits have become blurred.
Indeed, one wonders if this is an age of
peace or of war. Peace is presented as a
prelude to, preparation for, or meaning-
ful only in terms of, war. One is reminded
of the dictum in George Orwell's 1984
that "war is peace." In many countries
today, the Orwellian phenomenon
seems fast becoming a reality in which
"double-think" is enforced in order to
keep the people in a constant state of
war preparedness.
If this is the tragic condition of mankind
today, I am afraid that Japanese,
Chinese and Americans have had their
share in varying degrees in contributing
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to it. Any discussion of American-East
Asian relations in the 20th century would
have to start by recognizing this fact.
First of all, however one views the rise of
Japan as a modernized nation since the
late 19th century, there is little doubt that
this signalled the emergence of a military
power in Asia which caused other coun-
tries to respond in kind. Japan's victory
over Ch ina in 1894-1895 forced the
Chinese to undertake military modern-
ization, while 10 years later its defeat of
the Russian navy had the effect of mak-
ing Japanese power supreme in the
western Pacific. This caused Britain to
entrust the defense of its Asian empire to
Japan while it concentrated its fleet west
of India, in turn exacerbating the naval
rivalry with Germany.
The United States, in the meantime,
undertook a spectacular expansion of its
navy in the Pacific in the wake of the con-
quest of the Philippines and the annexa-
tion of Hawaii, and in response to the rise
of Japanese naval power. The Japanese
and the Americans never got over the
sense of naval confrontation across the
Pacific till they came to open blows in the
1940s.
The Pacific Ocean belied its name in
the 20th century; it became an arena
where the two navies vied with each
other for greater power, forcing their re-
spective governments to spend large
sums on ships and sailors. The burden
was particularly crushing ·on Japan, the
less developed of the two, as increased
armament meant higher taxes and
brought about the intrusion of the military
into politics. This was most notable in the
decade of the 1930s, which opened with
the navy-inspired assassinations and
plots to overthrow civilian government.
The army, on its part, sought to en-
hance its own position vis-e-vis: the navy
by similarly intervening in politics and
calling for the building of a huge conti-
nental empire, which would bring more
funds to the army.
Itwas no accident that the Manchurian
incident of 1931, involving a premedi-
tated attack on China's northeastern
provinces, was followed immediately by
the downfall of party government in
Japan and its replacement by cabinets
that did little more than take orders from
the military.
Military spending claimed larger and
larger shares of the national budget until,
on the eve of the American war in 1941,
almost 90 percent of the budget went to
armament. The production of consumer
goods was discouraged, and under the
slogan of "national mobilization," all
available manpower was incorporated
into a rigid system for war and war-
related services. Yet few people, even in
the military, knew what the war was all
about. Fighting came to be its own justifi-
cation; it was a war for war's sake. In
order to justify it, ttie government re-
sorted to massive propaganda. Echoing
Orwell's "double-think," the aggression
in China was called a sacred struggle for
East Asian culture - as if the effects of
atrocities and brutalities could somehow
be mitigated if they were called cultural
pursuits.
In retrospect, what is most appalling is
the way in which at first a few, then more,
and eventually the bulk of Japanese intel-
lectuals - academics, journalists,
teachers, writers - came to echo such
nonsense. Even highly respected schol-
ars with advanced degrees from the
world's best universities began mouth-
ing "double-think" slogans without realiz-
ing there were merely slogans. Their
country's militarization had caused their
minds and hearts to become militarized,
and they could not think of themselves,
their country, and the world in any other
fashion.
It was because of this very thorough
militarization that when Japan's military
machine was ruthlessly crushed by
American, Chinese, and other countries'
forces, its political institutions, economic
organizations, and minds were also de-
militarized. In 1945, with the military em-
pire in ruins, the only alternative was to
accept demilitarization and start building
a differently oriented society.
The passion with which Japan's politi-
cians, businessmen, and intellectuals
embraced the vision of what they called
"the nation of culture" rather than of arms,
reveals their disillusionment with militari-
zation and war. Because the modern
Japanese state had been virtually synon-
ymous with war and war preparedness, it
is not surprising that even the sense of
nationhood was lacking in Japan for a
long time after its defeat.
If a new national consciousness were to
be generated, it would have to be rooted
in a totally new definition of the country's
objectives and orientations. The postwar
constitution, renouncing war and stres-
sing the people's right to well-being, em-
bodied that definition.
Today,nearly 40 years after the defeat,
there are indications that the pendulum is
about to swing again so that Japan may
once more orient its economy and politics
toward war-making. Already the country's
military expenditures are the seventh
largest in the non-communist world, and
there are pressures for further increasing
them. Some even call for a nuclear arse-
nal. Unless the trend is reversed or mod-
erated, we may soon see Japan's re-
emergence as a major military power in
Asia, and a consequent militarization of
society. Instead of being a manufacturer
and exporter of consumer goods, a soci-
ety in which only one percent of the na-
tional income is spent on armament, the
country may turn into an exporter of arms,
one in which the arms industry provides
the engine of technological progress and
economic gain.
It would be simple if we were able to
trace the wars and militaristic tendencies
of 20th century Asia to just one source,
Japan. Unfortunately, Japanese milita-
rism has not been the exception, but
merely an extreme form of a more gen-
eral phenomenon. The United States,
and China as well, have contributed to
militarizing their societies and the Asia-
Pacific region.
Historians trace the origins of the so-
called "military-industrial complex" in the
United States to World War II,when close
cooperation developed between private
industry and the military establishment,
under the supervision of the government.
The cooperation resulted in the creation of
the world's mightiest military power,which
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20 was perpetuated after the war. Even when
postwar American policy called for de-
mobilization and withdrawal of forces
from Europe, it may be recalled, there was
no thought of dismantling the naval and
air bases in the Pacific, including those in
the Philippines and Japan.
The armed forces of the United States
were involved in the governing of Japan,
Okinawa, and South Korea, and just as
steps began to be taken to reduce their
size, the North Korean invasion of the
South brought about a decisive military
response. The United States would retain
its military presence in the western Pacific
and on the continent of Asia to preserve
the status quo. It would keep Taiwan
separate from China. It would ally itself
with Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, and
other non-communist countries of Asia so
that they might constitute a military bloc
to obstruct Chinese and Soviet expan-
sion.
The strategy led inexorably to Ameri-
can involvement in Southeast Asia, reach-
ing a climax during 1965-1969 when more
than one million American troops fought
against the Vietnamese. That war came to
an end in 1975, but this has not meant
America's military withdrawal from Asia.
The stress since the late 1960s has been
on United States naval and air power,
combined with a new relationship with the
People's Republic of China as well as Ja-
pan, so as to match the Soviet Union's
growing naval presence in the area.
In all this seemingly endless arms race,
there was a time, durlnq the 1970s, when
American leaders and public opinion fa-
vored a rapprochement with Russia. They
spoke confidently of the end of the Cold
War and the coming of an era of competi-
tive cooperation between the two military
giants. Today, however, the stress is once
again on confrontation, necessitating the
diversion of larger and larger shares of the
national income to arms buildup.
China, too, has developed as an ever
greater military power. The country's mili-
tary modernization started on the eve of
the Republican revolution of 1911, but un-
fortunately its armed forces spent much of
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the next several decades fighting against
one another rather than becoming unified
against an external enemy. Even so, the
vision of a strong China served to give
hope to a people devastated by internal
strife and foreign aggression. As Chiang
Kai-shek said during the war, China would
ultimately emerge as one of the global
powers and would contribute to preserv-
ing the military balance in the Asia-Pacific
region after Japan's defeat.
Such a vision ensured that once China
expelled Japan, its leaders would be
those who had trained themselves as mili-
tary strategists and officers. Here Chiang
Kai-shek and his allies were unable to re-
tain their power as they were opposed by
exponents of "people's war," those who
made no distinction between regulars
and militia or between war and peace
Constant struggle was a way of life for the
communists, and perpetual revolution
their doctrine.
In practice, the Chinese communists
were extremely cautious in dealing with
their neighbors, and they never wanted a
frontal war either with the United States or
the Soviet Union. Still, they have not
abandoned the concept of a global coali-
tion of Third World countries against the
superpowers, nor failed to include military
modernization as one of the cardinal
goals of the party.
The Chinese have been eager to de-
velop their own nuclear capabilities, and
have earmarked a large portion of their
foreign exchange for purchasing arms
from America and Europe. China's con-
trolled press extols the virtues of the Red
Army, and its educational policy empha-
sizes technical skills useful for further mili-
tary modernization.
The Soviet Union, too, is a military
power in Asia as well as in Europe. Like
Meiji Japan and Communist China, Soviet
Russia has developed as a militarily de-
fined country. Leninist conceptions of the
state and the world stressed that there
could never be true and stable peace until
all countries became socialist. But while
the early Bolsheviks were not entirely
committed to the traditional practices of
power politics, viewing them ?S a relic of
the bourgeois past, Stalin and his follow-
ers embraced them eagerly, believing
that the cardinal goal of the Soviet state
must be its military strengthehing.
Ideology or economic development was
secondary to that objective, and since the
1930s the Russian leaders have concen-
trated on heavy industry and armament
expansion, in the process creating a huge
military establishment which regularly
demands a larger share of the budget.
The Soviet Union is thus primarily a mili-
tary power, not an idealogical movement,
and as such its moves have been re-
sponded to by its neighbors, including
the United States, in similarly military fash-
ion. The Russian people are taught to
extol the virtues of the country's military
greatness and to look with suspicion at
the military programs and strategies of all
other countries.
Everything the Soviet Union has done is
justified as having been the only correct
course of aciton; evil motives and sinister
designs are attributed to the actions of
other countries. Such indoctriniation is
necessary to justify military spending and
to enable the leaders to remain in power.
In this fashion, Asia-no less than other
parts of the world -has been an arena of
intense armament rivalry, balance-of-
power politics, and militarization in the
20th century. Millions have died in war-
not just Asians but Americans, Russians,
and Europeans. While Japan, the United
States, China, and the Soviet Union have
not been engaged in war for some time,
other countries continue to conduct
small-scale fighting.
We can view all these phenomena cyn-
ically, or even philosophically, and say that
wars never cease because of a funda-
mental distrust among peoples and coun-
tries. Despite all the accumulated wisdom
about causes of war, it has not been
possible to go beyond the ancient
Chinese Legalist view that lack of trust in
each other is a basic human condition,
and that statecraft must be built on that
assumption. Even in as optimistic a soci-
ety as America, we recall George Wash-
ington declaring (in the farewell address)
that one should never base a country's
foreign policy on the trustworthiness of
other nations: This view, which in the
modern world was most clearly formu-
late~ by Thomas Hobbes, postulates that
because human nature is basically evil,
war is a permanent, normal condition of
life. Peace ismerely a temporary absence
of war. A country, even if it is at peace,
must be prepared for the next war.
"Willingness to fight is itself
evidence of a society's
maturity ... "
In 18th century Europe such thinking
was reinforced by scientific rationalism so
that warfare and war preparedness came
to take on aspects of modern science in
which "rational" considerations would en-
able statesmen to conduct successful di-
plomacy and warfare. The 19th century
added to the equation the Clausewitzian
dictum that war is an extension of politics
by other means, that is, that external war-
fare and internal political arrangements
are two sides of the same coin. Ifa country
is to be successful in war, it must have a
domestic political structure commensu-
rate with the task. Conversely, once a war
has begun, it must be conducted, and
ended, in such a way as to strengthen the
polity
If Clausewitz's strategic thought was
the 19thcentury's gift to mankind, the 20th
century added its own contributions.
Modern biology and anthropology pro-
posed theories of human evolution and
societal progress in such a way as to
popularize the notion of survival of the fit-
test. War, in such conceptualization, is
seen as an engine of progress; it is only
through fighting, anthropologists and his-
torians pointed out, that a society or race
learns to organize itself effectively and
marshall all its resources for the collective
endeavor. Willingness to fight is itself evi-
dence of a society's maturity, and its sue-
cess in war attests to its ability to improve
technology and organization Only those
societies and races, writers pointed out,
that had successfully waged wars had
survived into the 20th century, while
others had long died, declined, and
atrophied.
While the naive racism of some of the
earlier biological theories has been re-
jected, and while the biologically-
grounded survival-of-the-fittest concept
has been largely discredited, these
theories have been followed by a more
nationalistic idea of struggle for survival, a
zero-sum game in which a country's gain
in armament or the global balance of
power is seen as another's loss.
All these ideas, from the ancient times
to the 20th century, indicate that man's
view of himself and his fellows has not
changed significantly in the last several
millennia. So long as such ideas are ac-
cepted by men, governments will have lit-
tle difficulty in orienting their countries to-
ward armament arid war.While a concern
with nuclear armament has made people
throughout the world focus on the
possibilities and dangers of a nuclear
holocaust, we should realize that atomic
warfare is only an extreme expression of a
more pervasive phenomenon, and that at
bottom lies what would appear to be the
unchanging human condition: one's dis-
trust of other human beings and willing-
ness to destory them before one is
destroyed.
This is a very gloomy picture. If that is all
there is to what I have called the human
condition, we would all have to brace our-
selves for further intensification of war
preparedness, armament rivalry, and to-
talitarian control, resulting in many more
wars and even in the final nuclear war that
could destroy the world. If such were the
case, all countries would become garri-
son states, in a constant state of readi-
ness for war, where governmental and
non-governmental activities would be
geared toward enhancing national power
In such a situation, as George Orwell so
graphically described in 1984, all efforts
would look to the near future, to prepared-
ness for the next war. That preoccupation
would determine how people should be
governed, how they should train for fight-
ing, what should happen to family life, and
even what people should know For they
should know only what would prepare the
state most effectively for war. They should
be concerned with the present and near
future. They should not remember the
past, lest their memory interfere with their
mental preparation for the future. Memory,
in fact, is non-existent in the world of
"1984."
It seems to me that this is the most
frightening aspect of the totalitarian state
that Orwell describes, and may have al-
ready become a reality in some parts of
the world. To control, alter, or wipe out
memory through state intervention is to
create a non-thinking human automaton
who is not constrained by a remembrance
of things past and who is thus capable of
detaching himself from all emotion and
consciousness.
Luckily, we have not yet lost our mem-
ory, and it seems to me that our con-
sciousness of the past does give us some
hope for the future. We remember not just
Japanese aggression in China, Pearl
Harbor, atomic bombings, or Vietnam, but
are also aware of another set of historical
experiences in the annals of American-
Asian relations. We recall periods of
peace that were much more than mere
interludes between wars; we remember
individual Americans, Chinese, and
Japanese whose primary interest was
trade, not war, and others who estab-
lished schools and hospitals abroad; and
we note that millions of Americans and
Asians learned about one another
through paintings, novels, music, and
films.
To ignore this record is to wipe out an
essential aspect of the history of
American-East Asian relations; and to say
that these activities had no meaning ex-
cept as obscure footnotes in the annals of
modern diplomacy and warfare is to deny
the reality of individual human endeavors
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22 and interests. Tobe cynical about the rec-
ord of private, individual activities is to run
counter to the observed fact that even in
strictly regimented authoritarian societies
it has not been possible to exterminate a
person's private as against communal
self.
Because many of these activities can
be broadly construed as cultural, we may
refer to this category of American-Asian
relations as cultural interchanges. The
duality of the history - on the one hand
the story of war and diplomacy, and on the
other that of cultural exchange - is
nowhere more strikingly illustrated than in
the record of American-Japanese rela-
tions. At one level, this record consists of
the two countries' power confrontation
and war, as already sketched. At another
level, one notices that there has been a
consistent pattern of the Americanization
of Japanese culture.
As early as the first Meiji years, more
Japanese students were sent to the
United States to study than to any other
country. The trend has continued to this
day virtually uninterrupted. Of the nearly
15,000 Japanese students abroad, two-
thirds are now in America. Conversely,
since the late 19th century, more Ameri-
cans than others have gone to Japan as
teachers and missionaries.
While there have been more Asian, par-
ticularly Chinese, than American students
in Japan, the number of American stu-
dents has increased considerably in
recent years. In 1980, out of the total of
6,500 students from abroad, 550 came
from the United States. Of course, this
represents a tiny fragment of the popula-
tion of either Japan or America. Even to-
day, there are only some 125,000
Japanese visitors temporarily in the
United States as students, tourists or
businessmen, while the number of Ameri-
cans in Japan (about 23,000) is even
smaller. But this kind of human exchange
often has an influence quite out of propor-
tion to its size. For instance, women's
education in modern Japan has been,
from the beginning, promoted and influ-
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enced by American educators. Modern
Japan's women's history can never be
written without taking into account the
ideas and practices brought into Japan
by American missionaries and other edu-
cators, a significant number of them
women.
"The Japanese cultural ex-
perience was significantly af-
fected by the encounter with
American civilization .... "
Japanese students in America, on their
part, learned modern science, technol-
ogy, social sciences, and literature in col-
leges and universities, and then returned
home to write about them. Already, at the
beginning of the 20th century, they were
publishing accounts of such topics as the
philosophy of William James, the man-
agerial theories of Frederick W.Taylor,the
historical interpretations of Frederick
Jackson Turner,the novels by contempo-
rary American writers, and even the
operas being performed at the Met.
These instances, it is true, were not
exactly exchanges in the sense of a two-
way traffic of influences. The exchange
was overwhelmingly uni-directional, and
has remained so to this day. The fact re-
mains that the Japanese cultural experi-
ence was significantly affected by the en-
counter with aspects of American civiliza-
tion, and that individual Japanese came
to internalize American scholarly, literary,
or artistic developments. Their view of
their own culture was broadened, so that
what was taking place across the Pacific
was no longer an alien development of no
interest to Japan, but came to constitute a
vital part of their experience.
The transformation reached a climax
during the 1920s when observers noted
that Japanese culture was fast becoming
Americanized. This could best be seen in
popular and material culture, such as Hol-
lywood films, the radio, jazz music, and
baseball, but the phenomenon also in-
cluded agrowing interest inAmerican his-
tory and politics, which even brought
about a rising popularity of American de-
mocracy as the wave of the future.
This sense of affinity,'even approxima-
tion, with American culture was not re-
ciprocated in the United States, where the
1920s saw the enactment of an immigra-
tion law excluding Japanese, and where
scare stories about a possible war with
Japan were popular. Still, we must recall
that there were other developments, such
as the establishment of the American
Council of Learned Societies, one of
whose first projects was to promote the
study of East Asian culture and history,
and the organization of the Institute of
Pacific Relations, devoted to an educated
dialogue across the Pacific.
The 1920s also saw the beginnings of
Japanese studies programs at a small
number of universities. Unknown to con-
temporaries, these modest beginnings
were paving the way for the future growth
of Japanese studies in the United States.
It is good to remember, too, that American
scholars, journalists, and other writers at
that time were going through a skeptical,
even pessimistic phase about the unity of
knowledge or about the superiority of
modern Western culture. Theywere trying
to grapple with disturbing questions that
arose from the experiences of the Great
War and its aftermath, which seemed to
indicate that something was wrong with
the confident, progressivist view of West-
ern civilization that had been prevalent
earlier. Among other things, such skepti-
cism inspired fresh studies of other civili-
zations and races, and more tolerant
views of them were emerging by the early
1930s.
Unfortunately, such developments in
Japan and the United States did not pre-
vent the diplomatic crisis and confronta-
tion in the 1930s, leading ultimately to war
in 1941. If we assume that Japan in 1930
was moreAmericanized than ever before,
and that the United States was likewise
becoming more interested in and tolerant
of Japanese culture, we must also accept
that such cultural interactions were pow-
erless to avoid the Pacific crisis.
Despite their increasing cultural
Americanization, the Japanese cheered
their army as it conquered one Chinese
province after another, and if they felt a
contradiction between these two, they
sought to cope with it by de-
Americanizining their lives. Throughout
the01930s,governmental spokesmen and
publicists exhorted the people to shed
Western influences and to construct a
more indigenously based culture. Culture,
in such a context, instead of suggesting a
cosmopolitan outlook and friendly in-
teractions with other countries, was
politicized and became a handmaiden of
aggressive foreign policy.
In the United States, too, cultural
nationalism rather than cosmopolitanism
reemerged, the more so as there grew a
siege mentality, tormented domestically
by the Depression and externally by the
aggressive behavior of other countries.
Interest in cultural exchange was subor-
dinated to the need to reaffirm the
strength of American civilization. Here,
too, culture became an instrument of
foreign policy, as exemplified by the es-
tablishment of the Office of Cultural Affairs
in the Department of State in the late
1930s.
Japanese behavior in the 1930s may
indicate that when a country decides on
the pursuit of power and the use of force
abroad, its cultural activities are either ir-
relevant or become incorporated into na-
tional policy and thus lose their autonomy.
Certainly, it is a justified indictment of
Japanese intellectuals, educators, artists,
journalists, and others that they failed to
safeguard their cultural freedom but be-
came willing tools of the state. Yetit would
be wrong to say that they completely
ceased to be interested in cultural ex-
change. As late as 1941,such instances of
American culture as movies, jazz music,
and baseball were popular in Japan, and
American literary as well as scholarly writ-
ings continued to be avidly read. Perhaps
more important, in the context of our dis-
cussion of historical memory as an insurer
of freedom, the Japanese, even as they
committed atrocities on the continent and
shouted patriotic slogans at home, re-
tained vivid memories of the 1920s when
the country's politics, society, and culture
had been much more tolerant and
cosmopolitan. These memories would
serve them well once the nation lost the
war. They were not sufficient to stem the
tide of aggressive war, but without them
the subsequent history of Japanese-
American relations would have been very
different.
Something analogous may be said
about the situation in the United States.
The Japanese crisis and eventual war
abetted an emotional, often hysterical re-
sponse to everything Japanese;
Japanese art objects were destroyed and
Japanese residents incarcerated. Here,
too, however, scholarly interest in Japan
never disappeared. On the contrary, it
grew during the period. Japanese lan-
guage training was expanded, and as
many as 39 doctoral dissertations dealing
with Japan werewritten during 1941-1945.
It is easy to dismiss these efforts as
war-related; it was necessary to train
Japan specialists in order to interrogate
prisoners of war or to prepare for the oc-
cupation of the country. But these activi-
ties were buttressed by a view of the
1920s that corresponded to Japanese
perceptions. Americans, just like
Japanese, remembered the decade as
having been one of cooperation and cul-
tural exchange between the two peoples.
So long as the experiences of the 1920s
were remembered, it was easy for Ameri-
cans to conceive of postwar relations with
Japan in a framework other than that of
purely punitive occupation. It was for this
reason that American officials and schol-
arly advisers during the war laid much
more stress on educational reform, rather
than on the punishment of war criminals,
which would be necessary in Japan after
its defeat. Japanese education was once
again to be made more cosmopolitan,
oriented toward peaceful pursuits of cul-
turalobjectives.
Peace, culture, and cosmopolitanism
- these themes were written into the
postwar Japanese constitution, and have
been identified by the Japanese them-
selves as the mainstay of their postwar
history. But all these themes have had a
strongly American connotation. It has
been a. peace sustained by the
American-initiated postwar constitution
and by a security treaty with the United
States. Japan's postwar culture has been
very cosmopolitan, but American influ-
ence has been predominant.
The Japanese picked up their cultural
pursuits where they had left them in the
1930s to resume the process of Ameri-
canization begun earlier. The process
was vastly facilitated by the influx of hun-
dreds of thousands of American soldiers
and sailors, and by the fact that contact
with other countries was virtually non-ex-
istent in the early postwar years. It is also
noteworthy that even before 1952, when
the peace treaty went into effect formally
ending the state of war between Japan
and the United States, the latter invited
more than 800 Japanese students to
study in institutions of higher learning.
The trend was accelerated after 1952,
and altogether some 3,000 Japanese
were enrolled in American colleges and
universities throughout the '50s.
Most of these students were in their
teens and twenties, and their experiences
in American society in the 1950s were to
have a profound impact on Japanese
politics, business, and culture. Today
these men and women are in their forties
and fifties, occupying key positions in
government, industry, journalism, and
academic life. It would be no exaggera-
tion to say that they have contributed sub-
stantially to the creation of postwar
Japanese consciousness and continue to
orient Japanese society and culture along
cosmopolitan, in particular American,
ways.
If these men and women represent Ja-
pan's elites, the masses, too, have come
under American influence to a far greater
extent than before the war. Many of them
have visited the United States as tourists.
23
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Others became acquainted with Ameri-
can culture through imported foods and
fashions, through American movies which
represent nearly one-half of all foreign
films shown in Japan, or through visiting
American artists, tourists, and students.
There has also been a reciprocal
phenomenon. Although one cannot
speak of the Japanization of American life
to me same extent as the Americanization
of Japanese life, statistics indicate that al-
ready during the 1950s more than 300
American scholars visited Japan, and a
somewhat larger number of doctoral dis-
sertations were written dealing wholly or in
part with Japan. The trend accelerated in
the 1960s, and by 1970 there were more
than 400 Japan specialists in American
colleges and universities, where some
6,600 students were taking Japanese-
language courses.
Forthe bulk of Americans, Japan would
still remain a distant, linguistically inac-
cessible culture, but they, too, must have
become steadily aware of Japan through
its cameras, transistor radios, cars and
other products. Statistics indicate that
during the 1970s, an average of 15million
Americans annually travelled overseas, of
whom more than 60,000, or four-tenths of
one percent, went to Japan. This repre-
sents a far smaller proportion than
Japanese tourists, of whom about 18 per-
cent visited Hawaii and the continental
United States. Even so, the fact that as
many as 600,000 Americans crossed the
Pacific in the decade as temporary vis-
itors seems impressive.
More recently,there has been a qualita-
tive change in the types of Americans in
Japan. Besides tourists and students,
professional people such a businessmen
and lawyers as well as artists of all kinds
have been to the country in connection
with their professional pursuits. Japan has
become part of their spheres of action,
not a quaint civilization, but simply
another society where it is possible to en-
gage in business, intellectual and cultural
pursuits without a sense either of superior-
ity or defensiveness.
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"American-Japanese cultural
relations are but one example
... of the ways in which
people of diverse historical
backgrounds have come into
closer contact with one
another .... ss
What the record indicates is a steady
expansion of the mental universes and
perceived realities of both Americans and
Japanese over the last several decades.
Not all these developments have been
products of pleasant memories or friendly
intentions; for most people over the age of
fifty, the last war may still be the point of
departure as they think about American-
Japanese relations, and for younger
people affected by trade and other dis-
putes, the framework in which they com-
prehend these relations may be that of
economic competition and potential con-
flict. Nevertheless, one ignores other
phenomena at the risk of distorting some
important patterns in American-
Japanese relations, and in 20th century
history in general. For one could find a
similar record, although varied in diversity
and intensity, of cultural interactions be-
tween Americans and other Asians and
indeed with all other people.
American-Japanese cultural relations
are but one example, perhaps the most
notable, of the ways in which people of
diverse historical backgrounds have
come into closer contact with one
another, either directly through personal
travels and activities abroad or indirectly
through books, newspapers, films, or art
exhibits. This, it seems to me, is one le-
gacy that the 20th century can bestow
upon future generations. The century has
not been a very happy one in the annals of
mankind, but at least it has shown that it is
possible for individual men and women of
all societies to broaden their mental hori-
zons through increasing contact.
Of course, increasing contact does not
necessarily bring about peace and
friendship. On the contrary, it may give
rise to tensions and confirm preconceived
prejudices about one another. We are all
too aware of the fact that technological
innovations since the 19th century, which
narrowed distances between countries,
were paralleled by the growth of exclusive
nationalistic sentiments, which created a
psychological readiness to destroy one
another. It is precisely because of these
gloomy realities that one appreciates the
efforts of individuals here and abroad who
have refused to succumb to excessive
nationalism or to resign themselves to
becoming passive agents of state power,
giving up all ideas of autonomy and
freedom.
If indeed the overwhelming trend of
modern world history has been toward
greater and greater armament and to-
ward the aggrandizement of state power
at the expense of personal liberties,
cross-cultural pursuits by private indi-
viduals take on added signficance as
they give hope that not everything is in-
evitably leading toward war and
destruction.
To the extent that Americans and
Asians, coming from distinct traditions
and histories, have been open to mutual
influences and engaged in intellectual, ~r-
tistic, and educational exchanges, they
have contributed to asserting the cause of
cultural internationalism and freedom,
which ultimately provide the foundations
of peace. They have demonstrated that all
individuals are at least potential partners
in this task. The world's peaceful future
may well depend upon them.
In considering what is left of the 20th
century - indeed, what is left of the his-
tory of mankind-it may be hoped that all
of us who are committed to the survival
of freedom will intensify our cultural
endeavors in a self-conscious pursuit
of open-mindedness and mutual
understanding. 0
Akira Iriye is chairman of the Department of History
University of Chicago. The above was presented. at
the Sixth Annual Merze Tate Seminar in Diplomatic
History at Howard University, November 15,1982.
